It has been argued in this journal (Callicott, et.al., 2009) that the evidence advanced that Aldo Leopold was influenced by American Pragmatism is "imaginary,"
Southwest," ("Some Fundamentals") (1923) In the 1988 essay, I also cited a passage from Hadley in which, referring to William James, he celebrates the beliefs that "have preserved our fathers as an intuition and act on [them] as an instinct" (Hadley, 1913, p. 73) That phrase, taken out of context, may have encouraged readers to think I was attributing to Leopold acceptance of all or most of Hadley's ideas and, especially, that I see the "instinct" on which we act as static and unchanging. Today, I would skip the reference to intuition, which implies far less dynamism than Leopold's approach to learning through action, and instead I would emphasize that the key idea Leopold took from Hadley was a Pragmatic approach to knowledge in both science and morality. Leopold's beliefs, I should have said, despite significant changes in other respects (including a rejection of utilitarianism as a reliable and complete guide to conservation policy), held tightly throughout his career to a general epistemology based on experience. With respect to this latter commitment, method, and only one method for pursuing the truth, and that method is the method of experience. Learning in science depends upon it; learning how to live a full life depends upon it; and learning what is right and ethical is also a matter of experience.
I realize now that my particular way of making my point-claiming a "constancy" in Leopold's thought--misleadingly overstated my case. By 1923, Leopold had fastened onto the Darwinian/Pragmatic idea of testing "ideas" by observing the outcome of actions based on those ideas-experience. This aspect of his thought did not wane, and even intensified over time. Today, I would more circumspectly say that the other changes Leopold underwent between 1923 and his death were less important than, and mostly derivative upon, this central idea, because it functioned throughout his life as an antidote to ideology and disagreement without experimentation. More specifically, in response to Callicott, et.al.' s statement that according to me, "Leopold underwent no significant philosophical change in his long career as a practicing conservationist," I would clarify that he underwent no change in his philosophy of management, and that his rejection of utilitarianism-already full-blown in 1923 on my interpretation-was based more on empirical observation of management failures on the Southwestern Forest Reserves than on ideological speculation.
While on the topic of Leopold's changing views of utilitarianism, I should correct Callicott, et.al.' s misleading suggestion that I think Leopold, subsequent to his embrace of Pragmatism, continued to embrace Pinchot's version of utilitarianism. Indeed, Callicott, et.al. conflate Pragmatism with capitalistic utilitarianism, which misses the key implication that Leopold found a "third way" between Pinchot's utilitarian resource management and outright nonanthropocentrism (Norton, 2005, pp. 72-73) .
iii In fact, I
understand the final section of Some Fundamentals to embody a first step in his declaration of independence from Pinchot and his strongly production-oriented version of anthropocentric utilitarianism.
My point about constancy was to say that Leopold had adopted this idea of the epistemology of experience for a very specific purpose, and this change had already taken place by 1923. Leopold considered the failing managerial efforts of land managers in the Southwest (himself included) as the relevant "experience" for refuting Pinchot's utilitarian boosterism. My point, then, in emphasizing what stayed the same in Leopold's "philosophy of management" was the rule of experience-if the practices of a culture destroy the land and relationships on which the culture depends, it does not have the truth; in particular, Leopold already knew-based on his observation of the negative impacts of applying Pinchot's utilitarian management idea that the test of experience was proving that idea "false".
I thought I had made it clear that I attributed only a narrow aspect of Hadley's philosophy when, in section 2.3 of Sustainability, I introduced the ideas that I attribute to
Leopold as embracing the pragmatic method, with emphasis on an evaluative "model" Leopold adopted and used. Particularly, Leopold meant to apply the rule of experience to the management of the Southwest Territories: he, like Hadley, saw in the method of experience a Darwinian criterion that cuts through ideology and focuses on practices, on how a culture treats its land. In this case, it was a handy way of comparing the practices of various cultures by "measuring" their impact on the same expanse of semi-arid land he currently managed. Once it is recognized that the "model" I claim Leopold borrowed from Hadley does not entail an endorsement of Hadley's "jingoism" and praise for capitalism, the bulk of the Callicott et.al., paper is irrelevant to the current discussion because most of the paper is devoted to criticizing Hadleian ideas that neither Leopold, nor I, accept any responsibility for.
Part 2A: Pragmatism: Some Core Ideas
Before we can assess how this more targeted, epistemological understanding of Leopold's debt to the Pragmatists affected him, it is necessary to begin with a reasonably accurate summary of what Pragmatists' most centrally believe. While agreeing with
Callicott and colleagues that it is important to recognize diversity among Pragmatists, I
do not recognize any of the four "bedrock beliefs" Callicott, et.al., claim I attribute to Pragmatists (Callicott, et. al., 2009, p. 457) (3) The Social Character of the Self. Since all of our beliefs are considered fallible, we are always limited in perspective and yet knowledge creation proceeds.
According to Pragmatists, truth must be pursued through a community of inquirers, and correction of beliefs is a social activity. Peirce said: "Logic is rooted in the social principle." (Peirce, ) Further, since our thoughts are so thoroughly linguisticized, the language of a community shapes thoughts and the thoughts that are communicated.
(4) Radical Contingency. Pragmatists believe that the universe is wholly contingent, that there is chance in the universe, and that the world is encountered as risk and opportunity and it is up to humans and human communities to make sense of this contingent universe. While many empiricists have tried to stabilize beliefs by identifying linguistic forms as providing stability in the form of "analytic truths," this form of stability is elusive in itself, as living languages constantly change as they are used to communicate and cooperate. As the practices of communities change, their language changes as well. The categories which we divide the world into, which reflect our language, are ephemeral and constantly open to revision. Incomplete understanding of this Pragmatic theme causes Callicott , et. al. not to see how important language is to Pragmatists, and how thoroughly they reject necessary truths.
(5) Pluralism: Central to Pragmatism is the idea of "pluralism," which has two, related aspects. First, pluralism is advanced as a description of the world we encounter.
In everyday life, as well as in philosophy, we encounter many different frameworks of understanding, individuals who espouse different views, and fields/sub-fields whose members develop different jargons and different starting points, facing us with a difficult task even to understand, much less to agree with, other philosophers, other acquaintances, and other cultures (Minteer and Manning, 1999 Foundational knowledge is a priori in that the foundations must be undisputable.
Before proceeding to discuss how these ideas were embodied in Leopold's early philosophy of management, one point needs clarification. Callicott, et. al. protest that I seem to offer only two epistemological options, and then describes two options, one of which they characterize as 'a priori' ethics and the other as, "Hadley's definition." He then protests: "An epistemological mean lies between (a) the Cartesian extreme of a priori, self-evident truth and (b) the putatively Pragmatic extreme of a good guiding metaphor whose 'truth' is determined by the practical success of behavior guided by it.
The mean between these two extremes is the epistemology of science." (p. 471) To Callicott, et.al., then, I am simply confused by insisting on the method of experience and using it to criticize a priori elements in his and other environmental philosophies. between "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas", (Hume, 1748 , Section IV, Part 1) and it found a stable, if controversial home in the philosophy of logical empiricism. At last it seemed that empiricists had made their peace with necessity; necessity resides in our belief system in the form of meaning relationships which, in turn, rest on "rules of language."
Willard Van Orman Quine, however, discomfited this apparent stability by noting that the rules of language can change, and in living languages they often change because of new and unexpected observations; there is no sharp distinction between changing a belief and changing a rule of language; both are attempts to make our belief system, based on stored observations, current with incoming stimuli (Quine, 1953 for itself, for its own sake, as an end in itself is intrinsic." (Minteer, 2009, p. 143) In another recent paper, Callicott makes a similar pronouncement, "We subjects value objects in one or both of at least two ways-instrumentally or intrinsically-between which there is no middle term" (Callicott, 2002, p. 16) . While one cannot help but note the differing characterizations of the source of the distinction-in one case it is based on the esoteric language of a sub-specialty of ethics as discussed by a small group of professional philosophers, while in the second case the distinction is attributed to everyday linguistic usage-let us extract from the two sources a statement apparently implied by both:
S: Environmental values are of two types: instrumental or intrinsic."
What is the epistemological status of S? If we ask how we would determine whether S is true, it would appear that, in order to support S on on the basis of usage by environmental ethicists, we must first establish that the dichotomous theories of ethics introduced and defended by environmental ethicists are "true" (Williams, 1985) . Given For Pragmatists, this radical contingency is implied if one questions essentialism and
Aristotelian "natural kinds") (Dewey, 1910) . Callicott, et.al. thus 
attribute to
Pragmatism a negative view of the importance of language, when in fact pragmatists touted language as an adaptation of great importance for survival. For true Pragmatists, who reject all forms of essentialism and belief in natural kinds, the radical contingency of language means we can finally understand language as a tool of the understanding, to be used and tested in different situations. One expects language to be at the heart of our belief structure, our reasoning, and our orientation to the world. Their point-once having given up the ideational and the referential theories of meaning and the "logical truths" of scholasticism, having located meaning in social interactions, language and logic become tools that shape our world and make it manageable. Apparently, none of the sextet of critics has heard of "semiotics" or the "Pragmatics of language".
The Callicottians' cluelessness about Pragmatism is perhaps most obvious in their dogged emphasis on Leopold's use of "truth" as the subject of Hadley's definition of "right." My suggestion that, for Pragmatists, the line between "truth" and "right action" is sufficiently faint that it was unsurprising that Leopold made this substitution of "truth"
for "right" in the otherwise direct quotation (in 1923) , is based on the Pragmatist view of language. This view of language is based on Bernstein's 4 th attribute: "contingency." If one looks more deeply at this contingency as applied to language, according to the Pragmatists, one finds an intimate relationship between knowledge, action, and community. Indeed, knowledge is tested and shaped by communal action, rather than by the existence of a mechanical, predictable world that causes our perceptions and "corresponds" to our assertions. This Pragmatist point, later discussed by Wittgenstein in his discussion of language games and forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953, ) , suggests that cultures living in different environments will evolve different linguistic and conceptual tools. Their knowledge of their environment, and their ability to act and survive in that environment, are so intertwined that having the truth allows right action and acting rightly is a sign of having the truth. Once one becomes comfortable with Pragmatists' understanding of knowledge as integral to action-and with their suspicions of the factvalue dichotomy more generally-then one might say, for example, that members of a culture have found the "truth" about their land and habitat if they have developed a set of practices that allow them (and their practices) to evolve and survive in the environment they have made their "place." Speaking informally, the test of truth is action in a specific situation, and acting in a specific situation gives meaning to the truths we articulate. Ouspensky, to Muir, to the anthropocentric theists and the anthropocentric resource scientists. He saw these as alternative perspectives, each of which has its own language that highlights insights, but also suffers from weaknesses and inappropriate implications.
Because he accepted the conventional nature of language, and recognized how languages adopted by "managers" shape their behavior, he appreciated both the power-and the lability--of ways of talking. He saw, also, that the ultimate test of a set of conventions, linguistically and institutionally shaped, is the success of the set of behaviors of the culture that lives in a place through a language.
Second, the key breakthrough point that Leopold took from Hadley and the Pragmatists was the recognition that, once one rejects foundationalism and essentialism and embraces the contingency of language, the only basis human beings have to learn, whether in science or in ethics, is from experience. The experience in question, however, is not individual "Cartesian" or "Lockean" experience, it is not understood as chopped up into atomistic "images" which somehow "picture" reality, floating in spaceless consciousness: it is "social experience" (Bernstein's theme # 3). Unlike Locke, Hume, We also see Leopold's Pragmatism in his pluralism-a manifestation that may be hidden to anyone who insists on reading Leopold as a monist who thought he had found-or would ever find-the true "metaphysical foundations" of the land ethic.
Pluralism both permeates and shapes Leopold's discussion in the final part of the 1923
paper. The most obvious of these passages comes at the end of Leopold's discussion of Ouspensky and organicism; after exhibiting obvious interest and respect for this position,
Leopold says, "There is not much discrepancy, except in language, between this
[organicist] conception of a living earth, and the conception of a dead earth, with enormously slow, intricate, and interrelated functions among its parts, as given by physics, chemistry, and geology." (1923, p. 139) This is as clear an expression of William James's idea of living in a "pluriverse" as one is likely to find (James, 1909) , and its expression of the Pragmatist idea of contingency is made even more obvious given Leopold's repeated cautions about the contingency and ambiguity of language.
My reference to James, here, is deserving of further comment. Callicott, et. al The suggestion that Leopold was influenced by, and worked closely with pragmatists is not mere speculation. Developing the idea of a "third way", a nonutilitarian intellectual core of leaders who were unquestionably "progressives," but who rejected economic reductionism and economic determinism, Ben Minteer has provided the intellectual and cultural history to show that Leopold was one of a number of "second-generation" conservationists. These conservationists, influenced by Dewey and other pragmatists, conceived of their task as, first of all to criticize economic utilitarianism, and second to create a strong form of "civic environmentalism" that focused on building conservation character and on identifying an emergent public interest. In Leopold's case, this involved developing, as a core idea, the goal of identifying and serving "the public interest," and incorporating this idea into his later, expansive idea of "land health" (Minteer, 2006) . This intellectual history supports the view that Leopold's thought was integrated into the broader, third-way approach of intellectual leaders who broke decidedly from Pinchot, rejecting economic utilitarianism and rapid economic growth, and embracing a pragmatist-inspired goal of seeking the public good through civic conservation. by applying his perhaps unmatched observational abilities and associated tenacity in keeping a written record of changes he observed in the land. The paper was, in effect, a summary of his assessment, based on "horseback reconnaissance" of the various natural systems of the Southwest and of the impacts of the policies he, other governmental land managers, and private landowners were having on that land. The concluding section reacted to Leopold's empirical summary that cited multiple cases (overgrazing, destruction of watercourses, etc.) of degradation of resources under the land-management regimes of the Europeans. The paper "graded" management of the federal forest lands of the Southwest and concluded that current management was not protecting important resources such as grasslands and watercourses. Recognizing this, we should read the concluding section of the essay as a systematic search for a moral system that provides a critique of actions that, taken for short-term economic gain, can be seen, empirically, to lead to degradation of land.
Having first recognized that "Conservation as a Moral Issue" is the conclusion of a larger discussion, it is now possible to see the final section as functioning on two levels.
On one level, it provides a "survey" of possible ethics but also, and more importantly, it states a coherent argument that, in dealing with the public and decision makers, the anthropocentric position-despite its susceptibility to misuse and despite the many ways in which it creates deep ironies for human beings and human managers, can provide an ethic that is sufficient to guide us toward better policies. One need not, on this approach to the essay and to the section, see Leopold as adopting a single ethic and criticizing or ridiculing all alternatives. One can see him, alternatively, as looking for a system or systems of thought that would support his criticisms of specific practices he and his colleagues engage in, and as a guide toward better policies. when he writes, '(How happy a definition is that one of Hadley's which states, "Truth is that which prevails in the long run"!)' (Callicott, et. al., p. 465) But there is no reason to think that this sentence, while part of a clearly ironic passage, was thought by Leopold to be false. To take an analogy, on Callicott's understanding of irony, the following sentence would be confused or at least highly anomalous: "Ironically, Pro-Life advocates who oppose birth control and sex education actually increase the prevalence of abortions." Whether this sentence is actually true or not, when I hear a Pro-Choice advocate utter this sentence, I hardly question that they think the sentence is true and, being true, expresses an irony. If it were true that sentences used ironically are normally considered false by their speakers, every instance of the following sentence forms, however completed, would be confused or at least likely to be considered anomalous: "It is an ironic fact that…" or, once we discovered the truth that……, the full ironies of the situation became obvious." So, I begin by challenging the implied premise that, if
Leopold is engaged in irony in the passage in question, he must be rejecting and even "ridiculing" Hadley's definition.
Callicott quotes one definition of "irony" as "the use of words to express something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning" (p. Starting with this orientation of the final section as a culmination of the "accounting" system Leopold had used in evaluating long-term impacts of the management of grazing, we see that Leopold is searching for an ethic that will be applicable to his observations. In this context, and given Leopold's emphasis on grazing Leopold, in these last two paragraphs-the location of the much-disputed quotation from
Hadley-shows that an anthropocentric philosophy demands living sustainably and that this sustainability, based in an obligation to posterity, will also support protection of other species as the birthright of future generations. Hadley's views, while ridiculing Hadley (the one we are considering in Some Fundamentals), and the fourth, which was the last reference, after having ridiculed the idea a year earlier, is "enigmatic."
The first reference, from the Garden Club speech, in which he introduces
Hadley's idea as the great idea of his time, Leopold says: "When an idea has been tried by fire and adopted, it is known as the Truth. So firmly has this evolutionary character of Truth has been established that one of the modern philosophers-President Hadley of
Yale-now defines the truth as that which "prevails in the long run." (Quoted in Norton, 205, p. 66 with a different set of dynamics than do ecological and evolutionary processes and the much slower dynamics that drive them (O'Neill, et. al., 2007) .
I credit Leopold with having made a breakthrough in understanding the multiple scales of time and space as presenting different challenges to human actors and managers, and as recognizing that concern expressed at these multiple scales can be associated with different ways of valuing natural systems. On this more pluralistic interpretation, it is possible also to recognize that he saw the problem of finding appropriate policies to manage each of these dynamics, and to do so in a way that respects both human needs and desires, and the ecological constraints implicit in any plan to protect natural systems and the species that inhabit them. Hadley's definition was central in his attempt to integrate these two layers of value and associated dynamics. Because it applies not at the scale of individual consumers or hunters, but rather at the scale at which we judge the actions and practices of a culture, Leopold was able to match his environmental guideline-survival in the long run-to cultures and to treat the values so pursued as independent of the individual wants, needs, and choices that impinge on the system on the shorter term and more locally. On this middle ground, productivity is valued, but the means used to produce goods and services by a population-the cultural practices they evolve for living in a place--will not be judged simply according to rapid economic growth; they must also be adapted in the sense that these practices allow the culture to survive. I describe this middle way as follows: "The question…that Leopold's model sets out to address is whether a given culture has, or can develop, institutions and practices that will evolve responsibly to changes in its ecological context. By making the main question of survival one of developing institutions that are stable enough to perpetuate our current social values, including love of nature, and at the same time flexible enough to respond to rapid change both in culture and especially in the ecological context of cultures, Leopold shifted the question out of economics and out of ecology and into the area of active management." (Norton, 2005, pp. 72-73 hand, and what is "good for the land." According to the pluralist interpretation offered here, Leopold wanted an integrated ethic of management, one integrated over multiple levels, which allowed him to advocate different ethics depending on the nature and scale of a problem and also, in dealing with the public, other scientists, and decision makers to emphasize value orientations likely to appeal to them. Because I see Leopold as adopting-in the face of so much conflict and polarization among conservationists-the convergence hypothesis, there need be no dissembling or hypocrisy in recognizing that, in protecting ecological systems by managing the impacts of human communities ("cultures") at the ecological level, one is likely also to pursue policies that will protect the values of individual members of the culture both in the present and in the future (Norton, 1991; Minteer, 2009 ). This encouraged him to search for an integrated set of policies that will protect both ecological systems at the system scale, and aggregated human interests (over generations) at the same time. Since this controversy has been discussed in detail recently, I will only say here that the attempts to show counterexamples to the convergence hypothesis always choose some policy that humans think is in their interest and then to argue that this policy has damaged or will damage natural systems (Minteer, 2009 Leopold as adopting the same zero-sum reasoning that had created the polarization, attributing to him a key role for Pragmatic epistemology that emphasizes survivability of cultures as the ultimate test of "experience" shifts our attention to Leopold's successful anticipation of hierarchy theory, as embodied in the simile, "learning to think like a mountain." (Norton, 199x, 2005, Ch. 6) . Seeing Leopold as developing a scale-sensitive, multi-generational model for thinking through environmental policy quandaries enables one to see that Leopold, far from fighting again the first-generation conservation battles between Muir and Pinchot, was pointing toward a new direction, a direction that would emphasize "adaptation"-thereby recognizing Leopold's anticipation of adaptive management processes as opportunities to learn by doing-but it also recognizes that Leopold had provided a remarkable anticipation of what we would today call a concern for "sustainable living."
